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Summary  findings
To shed light on regional integration schemes in North  equations. In some cases, this difference is qualitative.
America  and Europe (and on the alleged  trading bloc in  Not surprisingly,  in virtually all cases the cross-country
East  Asia),  Dhar and Panagariya  explore the nature of  equation masks  large differences  among countries. The
bilateral  trade relationships.  coefficient associated  wit! 1 distance, for example, varies
Using the gravity model, they conduct an econometric  between  -4.4 and -O.4  across  the authors' equations. In
analysis  of trade flows between major trading countries,  almost every case the coefficienc  is statistically  significant
They estimate  bilateral trade flow equations using a data  at a confidence level of 95 percent or more.
set for 45 counrries  over 12 years and then use those  *  If there is an incra-regional  bias in trade, it is more
equations to study the contribution of trading blocs to  in North America  and among the founding members of
intra-regional  trade.  the European Union than in East Asia. Canada, the
Past investigators  have estimated the gravity equation  United States, and all countries of the EEC show an
using  data for total trade, pooling data across  countries.  intra-regional  bias in both exports and imports. In East
Dhar and Panagariya  estimate  separate equations for the  Asia,  on the other hand, exports in six out of nine
exports and imports of 22 countries (nine in East Asia,  countrics have a statistically  significant bias  away from
six in Europe, three in North America,  two in South  intra-regional markets.
America,  and one in Oceania).  * There is little support for the hypothesis  that East
Using  27 countries outside of North America,  East  Asian markets are closed  to trade with outside countries.
Asia, and the founding members of the European Union  * Contrary to conventional  wisdom, controlling for
(EEC)  as the control countries, Dhar and Panagariya  test  other variables,  many countrics export less to North
for each region's openness to trade with outside  America than to countries outside the three regions.
countries.  Similarly,  countries outside  the EEC export more to the
They conclude that:  EEC than to countries in the control group.
Results based on individual-country  equations differ
greatly  from those obtained from pooled, cross-country
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to EastAsia"  (RPO 677-86). Copies  of this paer  are available  free from the World Bank,  1518 H StreetNW, Washington,
DC 20433. Please  contact Jennifer Ngaine, room R2-054, extension 37959 (39 pages).  October 1994.
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Tables  271.  Introduction
Paradoxically, both the revival of regional integration around the world and disintegration
of the CMEA and the Soviet Union have led to a renewal of interest in the gravity equation.
On the one hand, Krugman (6Y91), Frankel (1993) and Saxonhowse  (1993) have applied the
model to study regional biases in international trade while, on the other, Collins and Rodrik
(1991), Havrylyshyn and Pritchett (1991), and Wang and Winters (1991) have used it to predict
post-reform trade flows of the countries in Eastern Europe and ex-Soviet Union.
Traditional theories of international trade focus almost exclusively on the determinants
of a country's exports and imports and do not address the issue of the direction of trade.  As
such, theories which provide guidance on the determinants of direction of trade are virtually
nonexistent. 1 Yet,  in  the context  of  regional integration schemes  such  as  the  European
Economic Community (EEC), European Free Trade Area (EFTA), North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and the alleged East Asian trading bloc, an understanding of bilateral trade
relationships is critical-'  Not surprisingly, because it forms the basis of econometric analysis
of bilateral trade flows, interest in the gravity equation has risen with the interest in regionalism.
The  equation has  yielded consistently better  fits  than any  other  empirical  relationship in
'Perhaps  the only paper which focuses on this question is the relatively recent paper by
Markusen (1986).  Markusen constructs a model with three regions - two in the North and one
in the South - and neatly combines scale economies, product differentiation, non-homothetic
preferences and  factor-endowment differences to generate  a realistic pattern  of trade.  For
plausible configurations of factor-endowment  differences, he shows that the regions in the North
must trade in differentiated products with each other and each of them must also export these
products to the South in return for homogeneous products.  The model also predicts a larger
volume of trade between the two capital-abundant  Northern regions than between each of them
and the South.
2 Countries of East Asia studied in this paper are listed in Appendix 1.
1international trade literature. 3
The gravity model was pioneered independently by Tinbergen (1962) and Poyhonen
(1963) and extended by Linneman (1966).  The first two authors postulated that bilateral trade
flows are related positively to the GDPs of the trading countries and negatively to the distance
between them; the last included populations of the two countries as explanatory variables in the
model.  Though the broad objective of the original authors was to identify the determinants of
bilateral trade flows, subsequent investigators have gone on to employ the model for at least
three additional purposes.  First,  the equation has been employed to test whether preferential
trading  arrangements including free  trade  areas  (FTAs) and  customs unions (CUs) have a
statistically significant effect on bilateral trade flows.  Second, the equation has been employed
to test the Linder hypothesis that trade in manufactres  is more intense among rich countries
with similar per-capita incomes. Finally, the equation has been used to predict equilibrium trade
flows of formerly socialist countries in the post-reform era.
Aitken (1973) was the first one to test for the effects of regional arrangements on trade
flows.  Introducing dumnmy  variables  for  trading partners  belonging to  the  same  regional
grouping (EEC or EFTA), he found statistically significant  effects of these arrangements. Later,
Thursby and Thursby (1987) and Bergstrand (1985, 1989) also included dummy variables for
the EEC and EFTA in their equations but obtained mixed results.  More recently,  as noted
above, Frankel (1992) and Saxonhouse (1993) have used the gravity equation to test whether
there is a de facto  trading bloc in East Asia.  The former uses Aitken's equation in a slightly
modified form and estimates it for total bilateral trade flows, while the latter introduces factor
3 For a sumunary of the empirical literature, see Deardorff (1984).
2endowments  into the equation and estimates it for several 3-digit SITC commodity groups.  Both
reject the hypothesis of a trading bloc in East Asia.
The Linder hypothesis has  been the  main focus of  the contributions by,  inter alia,
Thursby an Thursby (1987), Balassa and Bauwens (1988), and Hanink (1990).  All these studies
fmd strong support for the hypothesis that similar rich countries trade more intensively with each
other in manufactures than dissimilar ones.  The use of the gravity equation for predicting trade
flows is of a more recent origin.  Demise of the CMEA and the Soviet Union and a move
towards more  liberal and  outward oriented  policies has  meant  that  trade  flows  of  these
economies will be drastically reoriented.  Collins and Rodrik (1991), Havrylyshyn and Pritchett
(1991) and Wang and Winters (1991) have all applied gravity equations estimated for market
economies to predict trade flows of the countries in Eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet Union in
the post-reform equilibrium.
In  this paper,  we  subject the  gravity  equation  to  a  far  more  careful  and  detailed
econometric analysis than has been done to-date.  We then re-examine the issues of regional
trading blocs using the esfimated equations.'  In  a companion paper,  Dhar  and Panagariya
(1994), we also examine the issue of prediction of trade flows using the gravity model. 5
Purely in terms  of the quality of estimation, we contribute to  the literature in  three
important ways.  First,  we work with a much larger data set than done by anyone so far.
Second, with the sole exception of Thursby and Thursby (1987), authors have pooled the data
4IFor  a discussion of various policy issues relating to the regional option for East Asia, see
Panagariya (1993).
s  Srinivasan and Canonero (1993) simulate the effects of preferential trading in the context
of South Asian countries.
3for different countries and gone on to fit the same equation to trade flows of all countries in the
sample. 6 Our  statistical tests  lead  to  an unequivocal rejection of  the  hypothesis that the
coefficients across countries are identical.  Therefore, we estimate the equation separately for
each country and present 22 such cases in this paper.  Finally, most investigators (e.g., Aitken,
Frankel, and Bergstrand) have estimated the equation using total trade rather than exports and
imports separately.  We test the hypothesis of equality of coefficients for exports and imports
for all countries and overwhelmingly reject it.  We then estimate separate equations for exports
and imports.
These methodological changes lead to a richer set of results than obtained so far.  The
conclusions  drawn from individual country equations are very different from those obtained from
traditional pooled, cross-country equations.  In virtually all cases, not surprisingly, the cross-
country equation masks large differences across countries, even after inclusion of summary
measures for variation in policy and size.  For example, the coefficient associated with distance
varies between -4.4 and -0.44 across equations.
Intra-regional bias in trade is to be found more in North America and the EEC than East
Asia.  Canada, the U.S.A.  and all countries in the EEC show intra-regional bias in exports as
well as imports.  In East Asia, exports of 6 out of 9 countries have a statistically significant bias
away  firom intra-regional markets.  We also compare the openness of each of the three regions
with a control group of 27 countries outside North America, EEC and East Asia.  Our results
6  Thursby and  Thursby  include several  short-mn  variables  such  as  the  exchange-rate
variability and prices in the equations.  This mixing-up of  short run and long run variables
inevitably influences their results.  In this paper, we follow closely the pure gravity equation as,
for example, in Aitken (1973) and Frankel (1992) and include only the long-run variables.
4do not support the hypothesis that East Asian markets are closed to outside countries.  Cetris
paribus,  for countries outside the EEC, exports to the EEC are larger than to countries in the
control group.  Most surprisingly and contrary to the conventional wisdom, controlling for other
variables, exports to North America are less than to countries outside the three regions for all
EEC countries and Australia!
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we discuss the basic gravity equation
and its rationale and report diagnostic tests performed to arrive at particular form(s) in which
we estimate it.  In Section 3, we estimate the equation for a group of 22 countries and discuss
its implications.  In Section 4, we make concluding remarks.
2.  Rationale  and  Diagnostic Tests
Gravitational force between two bodies is directly proportional to  the mass of those
bodies  and  inversely proportional to the  distance between them.  By  analogy, the gravity
equation postulates that bilateral trade flows are directly proportional to the mass of the two
nations (represented by their GDPsj and inversely proportional to the disance  between them.
This basic relationship is often augmented by inclusion of other variables such as per-capita
GiDPs  of the two countries, a durvay variable for a common  border and other dumy  variables
to represent memberships in different regional arrangements.'  Because a key issue we wish to
address concerns the presence of regional trading blocs in Europe, North America, and East
7 Rationale for the inclusion of price and exchange rate variables by Thursby and Thursby
(1987) and Bergstrand (1985, 1989) is derived  from essentially partial equilibrium models.
Bergstrand lays out a general equilibrium model but then chooses not to solve for equilibrium
prices.  As illustrated in Anderson (1979) and Markusen (1986), once we solve for prices, only
income or endowments variables should appear in the equation.  This is particularly true if we
are interested in the determinant  of long-run trade flows.
5Asia, we can represent this relationship by
InTJ'  P 0 + Pln(DISTANCFI4  + p2(BORDER)  + P,In(GDPi)
+  p4 n(GDP?  + P5In(FCGDP 1)  + Pln(PCGDPJ)  + P 7(EC6j)
(1)
+  P(NAj)  +  39A)  +
i  1..&,  j  l... n;  i  o j;  n,  s n,.
where superscript i denotes the reporter country, j the partner country, na the total number of
reporter countries in the sample and nj  the total number of partner countries.  Traditionally, this
equation is estimated in natural logarithms of the variables.  TJ stands for either the value of
exports from country i to country j or the value of imports into country i from country j or the
sum  of the  two (i.e.,  total  value of  trade between i and j).  In the  discussion below,  we
frequently refer to i as the reporter country and to j as the partner country.
DISTANCE}  denotes the distance between countries i and j and GD?  and PCGDPi the
total and per-capita gross domestic product of country i, respectively.  BORDIER and the last
three variables are dummy variables.  The former equals 1 if i and j have a common border but
0 otherwise.  EC6J  takes a value of 1 if i and j are both in the EEC but 0 otherwise.  NAj and
EA,J  have a similar interpretation where the former stands for North America and the latter for
East Asia.8
Equation (1) does not have a strong theoretical foundation and the reasoning behind the
8 Unless otherwise noted, EEC  (EC6) includes the original six members, NA comprises
Canada, USA and Mexico, and EA is defined to cover the ten countries in East Asia listed in
Appendix 1.
6explanatory variables is largely intuitive. 9 Distance is expected to have a negative coefficient
because transport costs rise and access to information  may decline as distance rises.  Controlling
for distance, adjacency (BORDER) is expected to contribute positively to trade because of
possibilities of border trade  and cultural and linguistic ties which may not be picked up by
distance.  This  effect is  not  entirely unambiguous, however;  if  there  is hostility between
neighboring nations, the effect may be the opposite. Controlling for per-capita GDP, GDPs are
thought to have a positive effect on the absolute level of trade and this can be shown with the
help of a multi-country, multi-good Ricardian model (Anderson 1979).  It is possible (though
not plausible), however, for the reporter country's GDP to have a negative effect on the value
of its trade.  For example, in the Heckscher-Ohlin model, if all factors expand proportionately
in the reporter country, the latter's  per-capita GDP remains unaffected while the GDP rises.
If the e.asticity of foreign demand for the country's exports is sufficiently low, even though the
quantities  of  exports and  imports rise,  their value may decline.10 Per-capita incomes are
generally hypothesized  to have a positive effect on trade because, controlling for the GDP, the
higher the per-capita income the greater the demand for differentiated products and the greater
the  degree  of  specialization in  production.  Here  again,  the  argument is  not  watertight.
According to the Linder hypothesis, trade expands with a reduction in differences in per-capita
incomes.  This suggests opposite signs for per-capita incomes of the two countries."  The last
9  A  post rationalizations of the gravity equation include Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand
(1985, 1989).
10  For more on this, see Thrsby  and Thursby (1987) and Bergstrand (1985, 1989).
1 Thursby and Thursby (1987) postulate it by the absolute difference in per-capita incomes
of reporter and partner counties.
7three dummy variables test for possible regional bias and are expected to have posidtve signs.
Frankel (1993) is the main author who uses the tradftional  gravity equation to address
the issue of an East Asian trading bloc.  The equation he employs is slightly different from ours,
To wit, he estimates the equation in the form
In?)  . +  0  acIaln(DISTANCEJB)  . 2(BORDER)  +  ln(GDP.GDPJ)
(1')
+  a4U(OCGDP.PC3DPj)  + as(C6b +  CcsLNAj)  + £OAJ)  +  Uj
In effect, Frankel restricts equation (1) such that coefficients associated with the reporter- and
partner-country GDPs and those associated with the two per-capita GDPs are identical.  Since
theory does not give a clear guidance on the signs of the reporter-country GDP and per-capita
GDP and our tests do not support the hypothesis of equality of coefficients between the two
GDPs and per-capita GDPs, we have chosen to report the results using the more flexible form
in (1).
Our data set includes annual data on 45 countries listed in Appendix 1 for years 1980-92.
The sample includes aIl the OECD countries, and all the countries with significant amount of
trade  in  East Asia,  South Asia,  and Latin America.  We  excluded the  countries in Africa
primarily because the quality of data in that region is significantly poorer than elsewhere and
because the distance variable in that region does not capture the same factors as elsewhere due
to poor accessibility in general.  We also excluded the countries in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union.  Because the observed data for 1992 was incomplete at the time of writing, we
used it only to compare against the predictions from our estimated equations for that year (Dhar
and Panagariya, 1994).
8We subject  the data to tbree diagnostic  tests. First, we  tested  for heteroskedasticity.  We
rejected  the hypothesis  of no heteroskedasticity  with the probability  of 99.99% in all our tests.
Therefore,  we applied  the Huber-White  correction  to all our coefficients  and test statistics.
Second,  we formally  tested the hypothesis  of equality  of coefficients  across countries.
Equation  (1) is traditionally  estimated  by pooling  the data for all reporter  countries  for one or
more years. This amounts  to the restriction  that exports of, say, Venezuela,  follow  the same
relationship  as exports of U.S.A. Because  this seemed  unlikely  to us, we chose to test formally
the hypothesis  that the coefficients  in equation  (1) are identical  across countries.' 2
Because  the test is slightly tricky, it is useful to spell it out explicitly.  The country
equation  equivalent  to (1) takes the fcrm
InST  =P'  + P 1In  (DSTANC4)  + P2(BORDER!  + P4n(GDPt)
+  PhIn(GDPjt)  +  Iln(PCGDP)  + p(EC6j
(2)
+  K  A)  +  PI4EA  + u
j  =  1,...  t  = 1980,...1991;  i *j.
The coefficients,  distinguished  by superscript  i, are now country  specific. The time subscript
is denoted  by t.'3 In a country equation, there being only one reporter, the cross-country
1 At the minimum,  one must control  for country-specific  fixed  effects. If this is not done,
the regional  dummies  in (1) and (1') are likely  to pick up country-specific  effects  rather than the
pure "regional"  effect.
13 We can fix  t to any particular  year and still estimte (2) using  44 observations  for a given
i.  Allowing  t to vary increases  the degrees  of freedom.
9source of variation is absent.'4 Because the correlation coefficient between the reporter GDP
and  per-capita income for most of  the 22  countries for  which we estimated the equations
exceeded 0.9, we have dropped PCGDPi as an explanatory variable in (2).
Returning to the test for pooling, recall that as defined, regional dummies take a value
of 1 if both the reporter and partner belong to the same region and 0 otierwise.  Therefore, for
a given estimated equation, if  the reporter  (country i) does not belong to any  of the three
regions, the last three variables are equal to zero.  If i belongs to one of the regions, two of the
three dummy variables sfill take a value of zero.
These observations imply that in testing the hypothesis of equality of coefficients across
reporting countries, we must include the coefficient associated  with a regional dummy only when
comparing two countries in the same region.  In all other cases, the regional duy  should be
excluded because either the dummy does not enter the equation (as in the case of counties  not
belonging to any region) or the regional dummies in the two equations are different (as when
they belong to different regions).
To limit the number of cases, we chose to apply the test to exports from a total of 22
countries to 44 partner countries. 15 The reporter countries include 9 countries from East Asia
(minus China). 3 from North America, 5 from the EEC (Belgium and Luxembourg appear as
one in the data) and 5 outside these regions. 16 Even then, limiting the test to exports alone,
141In pooled cross-country data there is sufficient variation in population across counties
to rule out multicollinearity between the GDP and per-capita GDP.
I  Countries listed in Appendix 1 are the 45 partners in trade.
16 Focus on the issue of regional bias in trade made us include the major players in the three
regions.  If regional effects prevail, they must exist in the original members of the EEC and the
major countries in Fast Asia and North America.  Unfortunately, China was dropped from the
10we have 231 pairs of countries to compare.  We rejected the null hypothesis of the equality of
coefficients across countries in every one of these cases with 99.99% probability.  Indeed, in
the majority of the cases, the much stronger hypothesis of equality of individual  coefficients was
rejected with a 90% or higher probability.
Our final diagnostic test was with respect to the equality of coefficients across exports
and imports of a given country.  We carried out this test for the 22 countries mentioned earlier
and rejected the null hypothesis that coefficients in the export and import equations are equal
with a probability of 99.99% in each case.
3.  Estination
Based on our diagnostic tests, we estimate separate export and import equations, without
PCGDP,  for  each of the 22 countries using the Huber-White correction.  For  purposes of
comparison, we also estimate the gravity equation by pooling data from these same 22 reporter
countries.  The latter is presented at the bottom of Tables 1, 2 and 3.  For brevity, we discuss
only the equations for exports in detil.  Import equations are discussed only when the results
are different from those of export equations.  Both export and import equations are presented
at the end of the paper.
3.1  The Bsasic  Equation
We begin by estimating (2) in the simplest form, dropping all regional dummy variables
(Table  1A).  Measured by both the adjusted R2 and root mean square error (MSE), on the
average, country-specific equations give better fits than the pooled equation.  For exports, in 16
list due to unavailability of data over the entire sample period.  For comparison purposes, we
also included two countries in Latin America, one in South Asia, one in Europe and Australia
in our sample.
11out of 22 cases, the country-specific  equation  does better on the basis of both the adjusted  ii
or root MSE.  In two additional  cases, it does better on the basis of one of the two criteria.
Countries  for which the adjusted  R 2 is lower and/or root MSE is higher than in the pooled
equation  are Argentina,  Mexico,  Indonesia,  Korea,  Taiwan  (China)  and Singapore. Fits for fast-
growing  countries  of East  Asia, particularly  Korea  and Singapore,  and for Argentina  and Mexico
are consistently  poor.  A large proportion of the variation in exports and imports of these
countries is  not explained by  the  limited number of  explanatory variables used  in. our
regressions.  Remarkably,  fits for India are very good suggesting  perhaps that though the
controls may have influenced  the level of trade, the direction of trade was detemiined by
conventional  variables.
Perhaps  the most stiking point is that for countries  in the EEC and Japan, the adjusted
R 2 lies between  0.83 and 0.91. Thus, for these countries,  both imports  and exports are largely
explained  by the smal number  of variables  included  in our equation. Room for any regional
variables to add to the explanatory  power is limited.  One is almost tempted to reject the
hypothesis  of major  regional  effects  in these  countries  and terminate  investigation  at this point.
But this is perhaps hasty and unscientific.
Turning  to individual  coefficients,  DISTANCE  has a negative  and statistically  significant
coefficient  (at 99% level) in 37 out of 44 cases.' 7 This is not surprising  in view of what is
already known  from gravity  equations  estimated  using  pooled data. What is surprising  is that,
'7Canada  and U.S.A. are the only  countries  where  the coefficient  has a positive  sign  in both
export  and import  equations. But later, after  we control  for all regional  effects  (Tables  3A), the
coefficient  of distance  in all cases except  Korea becomes  positive  and statistically  significant.
The fit for Korea has been consistently  poor with adjusted  R 2 lying  between  0.28 and 0.5.
12unlike the impression conveyed in the literature on  the basis of pooled gravity equation (e.g.,
Anderson, 1979), the value of the coefficient varies considerably across individual countries and
differs from -1 (in most cases, even statistically significantly).  For exports, the coefficient
ranges from -0.5 for Great Britain to -3.5 for Indonesia.  In the pooled equations shown at the
bottom of Table 1A, the coefficient does turn out to be close to -1, with extremely high t-ratios.
Next, consider the coefficient of BORDER.  A common conclusion from the pooled
gravity equation is that, controlling for distance, the presence of a common border contributes
positively to trade.  This is borne out by both of our pooled equations.  The coefficient is 0.35
for the export equation with t-ratios in excess of 3.  But, as in the case of DISTANCE, the
common coefficient for  all countries in the pooled equation hides substantial cross-country
differences.'  Indeed, when estimated at the level of the country, in some cases, even the sign
of the coefficient switches-  For example, in the case of India, as one will expect on the basis
of hostility between her and China and Pakistan, the coefficient is negative in both the export
and import equation.  For reasons that are not entirely clear, a common border also contributes
negatively to the exports of Mexico, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia.  For  the latter two
countries, imports are also negatively related to common border.  When positive, the actual size
of the coefficient varies considerably across countries.  Tue coefficient is much smaller for the
EEC countries and has high t-ratios.  This may be because trade with countries that have a
common border but do not belong to the EEC is not so intense.
GDPj or the partner country GDP has a positive impact (with very strong t-ratios) on
IS Australia, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and ffie Philippines do not have a common border with
any of the 45 countries in our data set.
13both bilateral exports and imports of all countries considered.  In the pooled equation for both
exports and imports, the coefficient has a value around 0.85.  In country-specific equations the
coefficient varies between 1.4 and 0.5.  Except for exports of Argentina and Mexico, PCGDPJ,
the per capita GDP of the partner country also has a positive and, in most cases, a statistically
significant effect on trade.  This is consistent with the usual results from pooled regressions.
As noted before, GDP`, the reporter-country GDP, switches signs quite frequently across
countries when PCGD1", the reporter per-capita GDP, is also included in the equation.  As our
results show, this problem is alleviated considerably once we drop per-capita GDP from the
equation.  Only  for  Canada's  exports does  this  variable  have a  negative and  statistically
significant coefficient.  In more than half of the cases -26  out of 44  - the sign is positive and
highly significant.  This sign is far more stable than in Thursby and Thursby (1987).
3.2  hriJreducing Regional Dummies:  Is East Asia different?
In Table 2A, we introduce the first set of dummies aimed at capuring  regional effects
(equation 2).  The question under  investigation is  whether East Asia exhibits significantly
different intra-regional characteristics from other countries trading within their own region.
EC6, EA and NA take the value of  when both the  reporter  and partner in a bilateral trade
relation belong to the EEC, East Asia and North America, respectively.  If one or both partners
do not belong to these regions, the value is 0.  For Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Great Britain
and India, estimated equations remain the same as in Table IA.  For other countries, we have
one extra variable.
A critical issue in introducing the regional dummy is possible multicollinearity between
it and BORDER.  We checked the correlation between these two variables for each individual
14country and the group of 22 as a whole.  For the cross-section of 22 countries, correlations
between BORDER on the one hand and EC6, EA and NA on the other are 0.34, 0.06 and 0.23,
respectively.  For countries in North America, the correlation is 0.7 or more.  In the case of the
United States, the two variables become identical.  In the EEC, with the exception of Italy, the
correlation lies between 0.57 and 0.86.  At the country level, the correlation is low only in East
Asia.  There the correlation coefficient is 0.3 or lower (except for Malaysia where it is 0.53).
This implies that we cannot include both  the regional dummy and BORDER as explanatory
variables, except in the cross-section equations, Italy and the countries in East Asia region.
We  estimated  (2)  both  with  and  without  the  BORDER  dummy.  We  found  that
differences in results even for countries with low correlation between this variable and the
relevant  regional  dummy,  in  terms  of  the  adjusted RI and  MSE  were minimal 1 Only
equations for Argentina and Brazil show a noticeable fall in explanatory power when BORDER
is dropped from the equation.  Broadly, the importance of a common border diminishes once
we control for the common region.
For ease of comparison, we choose to present the results when BORDER is dropped as
an explanatory variable from all equations including the cross-section equation.  The estimated
coefficients are shown in Table 2A.?  Because the general sign pattern of the coefficients of
the original variables (included in Table 1A) does not change dramatically, in the following, we
'9 In the  cross-section equation, we found that the  coefficient of the EC6  dummy was
negative and stadtistcally  insignificant  when BORDER was included as an explanatory variable.
Curiously, in the country equations, EC6 has consistently positive and statisfically significant
coefficient irrespective of whether BORDER is included or not.
20 The estimates, corresponding to Table 2 and 3, where the estimator includes BORDER
as a dummy variable, are available from the authors.
15limit the discussion primarily to regional dummies.
According to pooled equations, location of both the reporter and partner in East Asia and
EEC have a positive and statistically significant effect on exports and imports.  For  North
America, the positive effect is statistically significant only for imports.  Coefficients for East
Asia are considerably larger in absolute value than those for North America or the EEC.  For
exports the value is 0.74 compafed to 0.15 for EEC and 0.14 for NA (statistically insignificant).
Tn  the case of intra-regional imports the coefficient is 1.28 for East Asia, 0.36 for EEC and 0.34
for NA.  These results lend some support to claims of intra-regional bias in East Asia and an
absence of such a bias in North American trade.
- The intra-regional bias shown in the cross-section equations is similar to that obtained
by Frankel (1993) for total trade.2'  He finds the coefficients for the East Asian block as the
strongest and most significant at 1.84 and for the EEC at 0.4.  The size of the coefficient for
Western Hemisphere is close to that for EEC and much smaller than that for East Asia.'  The
high significance of dummies for especially open countries like Singapore and Hong Kong and
a dummy where at least one of the partners is located in East Asia, when introduced along with
the regional dummy for East Asia, provides evidence of the general openness of this region.
However, one needs to compare this openness to trade with that of other regions.  Frankel also
21  The dummy variables in Frankel's  analysis are comparable, though he uses different
geographical aggregates except for the EEC.  His pooled equations are based on a larger number
of countries.  The sample also differs because he uses the average of total trade over a three-
year period as the dependent variable, whereas we are working with annual export and import
data spanning over a 12-year period.
2  As in the export equation in Table 2, the NA coefficient is also insignificant in Frankel's
estimation.  He overcomes it by extending that regional block to include the Lati  Amencan
countries.
16does not analyze the trading relations between the more-developed  and less-developed  partners
within East Asia, except for the case of Japan.  We find that the pattern can be better analyzed
when the trade flow is disaggregated into country-specific  exports and imports and through the
dummy variables defined in the next section.
The picture alters dramatically  when we estimate the equation at the level of the country.
For the EEC,  both for exports and imports, location of the partner in the same region has a
positive and statistically  significant  effect.  The magnitude of the coefficient is uniformly larger
than that in the corresponding  pooled equation and comparable  to the coefficients on which we
based the claim of intra-regional  bias in East Asian trade.  These results contradict the common
belief that the coefficient in a pooled equation is a weighted average (with positive weights, of
course) of corresponding coefficients  estimated from unpooled samples.  Based on the pooled
equation, we will accept the hypothesis of  low intra-regional bias in  EEC trade, specially
exports.  Iddividual country equations lead us to exactly the opposite conclusion.
For countries in East Asia, differences  between results obtained  from cross-section and
country equations are even more stark.  In the country equations, the regional dummy tells a
afferent story for exports and iimports.= In the export equation, the dummy is positive and
statistically significant  for only three (Japan, Korea and Taiwan (China)) out of nine countries.
For the remaining six, the coefficient is negative and, in five cases, statistically significant at
23  Note that there is no contadiction between a positive intra-regional  bias in exports and
a negative bias in imports or vice versa.  Because trade is not balanced bilaterally, controlling
for other variables, Japan may export more to its East Asian partners than to outside countries
but import less from them than the latter.  Also, a positive bias in intra-regional  exports of one
country need not imply a positive bias in imports of another country.  Indeed, in the absence of
balanced trade, it is even possible for all countries  to have intra-regional  bias in exports but not
in imports or vice versa.
1795% or higher level of confidence. These  results  contradict  the positive,  large and statistically
highly  significant  coefficient  of EA in the cross-section  equation. On the import  side, the story
from the pooled equation holds on the average.  Broadly, the bias is larger for the more
developed  economies  of the region - Japan, Korea and Taiwan  (China).
In North America the story is similar  to that in the EEC  for the developed  countries  but
not for Mexico.  The regional effect as captured by the NA dummy is  quite large and
statistically  highly significant  in both export and import  equations  of the U.S.A. and Canada.
In both cases the coefficients  are far larger than those  in the pooled equations. In the case of
Mexico for which fits have  been generally  poor, the coefficient  of NA in the export equation
remains  stubbornly  negative.
To summanze, the results so far suggest an intra-regional  bias in both exports and
imports  in the EEC and North  America. Contrary  to popular  claims, the bias is weaker  in East
Asia than in the EEC and North America. On the export side, 6 out of 9 countries  show a
negative  bias which is statistically  significant. On the import  side, the positive  bias being also
present in the ElEC  and North America,  is not peculiar  to East Asia.
3.3  Introducing the "Other Region" Effects
So far, we have allowed  for trade effects  which are purely intra-regional. We did not
control for the bias arising from the location of a partner in another bloc, for example, the
effects  on the exports  of a North American  country  due to the location  of a partner in the EEC
or East Asia.  It may be argued that if East Asia or the EEC is a closed bloc, ceteris  paribus,
the United States  will be able to export less to countries  in this region than to countries  not
belonging  to any bloc.  Controlling  for this bias, we can also compare  intra-regional  bias with
18extra-regional bias.  For example, we can consider the possibility that North America may be
more open than other regions to all  countries or that East Asia may be closed to outside
countries. To capture such effects, we now introduce  dummies for the three regions. Formally,
our equation now takes the form
hnTj,  =  I3 + P In  (DISTANCEj 1 ) + pi (BORDER)  + P1  In(GDP)
+ PI ln(GDP,)  + pbIn(PCDP)  + Pi  E6P 1 j)
(2')
+ PAj  + P'(EAP + u
j = 1,...n,,  t  = 1980,...1991; i  j.
where we add a "P" at the end of the symbol for each regional dunmmy  to distinguish it from the
corresponding dummy variable in (1).  EC6P,  EAP and NAP take the value of  1 when a
country's trade partner belongs to the EEC, East Asia and North America, respectively. If the
partner  does not belong to the region, the value is 0.  Note that the interpretation of the
coefficients  of these dummy  variables is different depending  on whether the reporter also belongs
to a given region or not.  When the reporter is in the same region, the dummy coincides with
that in the previous subsection and captures intra-regional effects.  If the reporter country is
outside the region, the dummy measures the general openness of the region.  For example, in
an East Asian country's equation, EAP measures intra-regional  bias but in a North American
country's equation, it measures openness  to outside countries.  If intra-regional  bias is present,
for a country located in East Asia, the coefficient  of EAP dummy will be positive. If East Asia
is more open than other countries, the coefficient  of EAP in equations of countries outside East
19Asia will be positive.
As before, we estimated (2') both with and without the BORDER dummy and finding no
consistent favorite, discuss the latter in Table 3A.
The first point to note is that compared with Table 2A, the adjusted R2 in country-specific
equations is consistently higher in Table 3A.  This means that the addition of partner dummies
increases the explanatory power of the model.  Though the Table lA  is not strictly comparable
to Tables 2A and 3A, due to the exclusion of BORDER, one can note the steady enhancement
of the explanatory power of  the model from the fall in root  MSE of the pooled equations.
Because the results of the dummies capturing intra-regional effects (i.e.,  the reporter lies in the
region represented by the dummy) remain qualitatively unchanged, in the following, we focus
on dummies capturing the effects of outside regions (i.e.,  when the reporter does not lie in the
region represented by the dummy).
Consider  first  the  export equation.  For  countries outside East Asia,  with  the  sole
exception of Mexico, EAP has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at well above
99% level of confidence.  For countries outside the EEC, the same holds true for EC6P except
in  the case of Japan  and Singapore.  For  Japan,  the coefficient is positive and  statistically
significant at 95%  level  of confidence while for  Singapore,  it  is negative and  statistically
insignificant.  For  countries  outside North  America,  the  coefficient of  NAP  shows more
ambiguity.  For  four out of five countries in the EEC,  NAP has a negative and statistically
significant coefficient at 99% level of confidence.  The same also holds tue  for Australia,
though not  for  countries  in  East Asia.  In  the  latter  case,  the  coefficient is  positive and
statistically significant at 99% level of confidence for seven out of nine countries and negative
20and statistically insignificant for the remaining two countries.  In sum, controlling for other
variables, countries export more to East Asia and the EEC than to countries outside the three
regions represented in equation (2').  Countries in the EEC export less to North America than
to countries outside the three regions in the sample.
A closer examination of Table 3A reveals that for four out of five countries in the EEC,
the coefficient of EAP is larger  than that of EC6P.  In other words, relative to countries outside
the three regions, the bias in exports in favor of East Asia is larger than the intra-regional bias!
This also holds true for Canada.  For U.S.A.,  the coefficient for EAP (1.32) is virtually the
same as for NAP (1.37), implying that the bias in favor of East Asia is not much less than intra-
regional bias.  For the majority of countries in East Asia, the bias is the largest in favor of the
EEC.  For Japan and Korea the intra-regional bias and for Taiwan (China) the bias in favor of
North  America predominates, when compared with  exports to  countries outside the  three
regions.
In the import equations we see some evidence supporting the hypothesis of a bias against
imports from North America.  Oddly, the evidence points not at Japan or much of East Asia but
at the EEC.  Relative to countries outside the three regions, there is a favorable bias for North
America but it is less than the intra-regional  bias.  The region that has -most  to complain against
Japan and Korea is the EEC whose coefficient is negative. 24
To conclude, for countries in the EEC,  on the  whole, the bias  in both exports and
imports is positive when the partner is in the EEC or East Asia while it is negative when the
24Dhar and Panagariya 1994b presents a detailed discussion on the trade relations between
Japan and USA.
21partner is in North  America. In the export equation,  except  in the case of Italy, the coefficient
of EAP is consistently  larger than that of  EC6P, contradicting  loudly the hypothesis  that East
Asian  markets  are closed  to outside  countries. Oddly  enough,  it is in the case of North  America
that exports show  a negative  and statistically  significant  bias for four of the five  countries  in the
EEC.
4.  Conclusion
Our findings  can be summarized  as follows. First, not surprisingly,  the results  based  on
individual  country  equations  are very different  from those obtained  from pooled,  cross-country
equations.  In some cases, the results are qualitatively  different.  A good example is the
coefficient  associated  with  distance,  which  shows  that bilateral  trade does not respond  uniformly
to the proximity  of nations. In cross-country  equations,  our results are broadly  in conformity
with the view of Anderson  (1979)  and others, that this coefficient  is approximately  equal to -
1."  Yet, in individual-country  equations, it ranges  from -4.4 (Thailand,  Table 2A) and -0.44
(Great  Britain,  Table IB). In virtually  all cases  the coefficient  is statistically  significant  at 99%
or higher level of confidence.
Second,  if there is intra-regional  bias in trade, it is to be found  more in North  America
and the EEC than East Asia. This result, from country-specific  equations,  is broadly  consistent
with that reached  by Frankel (1993)  from the pooled cross-country  equation. All countries  in
the EEC show intra-regional  bias in exports as well as imports. The same holds true for the
United States and Canada. For 6 out of 9 countries  in East Asia, exports have a statistically
25  In five out of six cross-country  equations  estimated  by us, the coefficient  lies between  -
0.89 and -0.99.  In the remaining  case, it is -0.75.
22significant bias away  from  intra-regional  markets.
Third, we are able to go another step beyond Frankel by testing for the openness of each
region to outside  countries.  Out of the 45 countries in our sample, those outside North America,
EEC and East Asia, serve as the control countries.  The openness  of each of the three regions
can be compared with this control group.  Our results do not support the hypothesis that East
Asian markets are closed to outside countries.  For example, in the export equation of U.S.A.,
controlling for other variables, exports to East Asia are larger than to countries in the control
group.  This conclusion holds true for all countries except Mexico.
Finally, in the same vein, we can consider the openness of the EEC and North America.
We find that, ceterisparibus,  for countries outside the EEC, exports to the EEC are larger than
to countries in the control group (i.e., outside the three regions).  For example, controlling for
other variables, exports of Indonesia  to EEC countries are larger than to countries in the control
group.  Most surprisingly and contrary to the conventional wisdom, for many countries, exports
to North America are less than to countries outside the three regions!  This is true for all EEC
countries and Australia.
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25APPENDIX  I
The Countries  are organized  In alphabetic  order  of acronymns
according  to Region
NAME  CODE  ACRONYM REGION
1  CHINA  156 CHN  EA
2  JAPAN  392 JPN  EA
3  INDONESIA  360  IDN  EA  - ASEAN4
4  MALAYSIA  458  MYS  EA  - ASEAN4
5  PHIUPPINES  608  PHL  EA  - ASEAN4
6  THAILAND  764  THA  EA  - ASEAN4
7  HONGKONG  344  HKG  EA- NIC
8  KOREA,  RP  410  KOR  EA  -NIC
9  TAIWAN  (CHINA)  8961  OAN  EA  - NIC
10  SINGAPORE  702  SGP  EA  - NIC
11 BELGIUM-WXEMBOURG  56  BLX  EC6
12  GERMANY,  FR  280  DEU  EC6
13  FRANCE  250  FRA  EC6
14  ITALY  380  ITA  EC6
15 NETHERLANDS  528 NLD  EC6
16  CANADA  124 CAN  NA
17 MEXICO  484  MEX  NA
18 USA  840  USA  NA
CONTROL
19 DENMARK  208  DNK  EC9
20  UNITED  KINGDOM  826 GBR  EC9
21  IRELAND  372  IRL  EC9
22  SPAIN  724 ESP  EC12
23  GREECE  300 GRC  EC12
24  PORTUGAL  620  PRT  EC12
25  AUSTRIA  40  AUT  EU
26  SWITZERLAND  756  CHE  EU
27  FINLAND  246  FIN  EU
28  NORWAY  578  NOR  EU
29  SWEDEN  752  SWE  EU
30  TURKEY  792 TUR  EU
31  ARGENTINA  32  ARG  LA
32  BOUVIA  68  BOL  LA
33  BRAZIL  76  BRA  LA
34  CHILE  152 CHL  LA
35  COLOMBIA  170 COL  LA
36  PERU  604 PER  LA
37  PARAGUAY  600 PRY  LA
38  URUGUAY  858  URY  LA
39  VENEZUELA  862 VEN  LA
40  AUSTRALIA  36  AUS  OCN
41  NEW  ZEALAND  554  NZL  OCN
42  BANGLADESH  50  BGD  SA
43  INDIA  356  IND  SA
44  SRI  LANKA  144 LKA  SA
45  PAKISTAN  586  PAK  SA
26APPENDIX 2
Years:  1980-1992 with the provision to expand to  1958-1968 for the comparison with
EC.
Trade:  XJ (M'J ) - Average annual US dollar value of exports (imports) between each
reporter and  partner for  1980-1992 from the  COMTRADE database of  UN
Statistical Organization, Geneva.
GDP:  GDPi, GDPj - GDP in US dollar of the reporter and partner for 1980-1992.
GDP per capita:  PCGDPi, PCGDPj - GDP per capita in  US dollar of the reporter and
partner for 1980-1992.
*  Nominal GDP from the National Accounts database of the World Bank which
uses the Atlas Method.  (Atlas Method - The data at current prices are converted
from the local currency to US dollars using a conversion factor other than the
official for each year,  when the  official exchange rate is greatly distorted.)
Populations of the reporter and partner for 1980-1992  from the IEC Social and
Demographic  Indicators database  were then used to obtain the nominal GDP per
capita
*  Real GDP per capita from the Summers Heston (1992) database for 1980-1988.
Populations of the reporter and partner for 1980-1988 from the same database
were then used to obtain the real GDP.
Size:  areai - Land area of the  reporter in  '000  sq. km.  from the  IEC Social and
Demographic Indicators database.
Distarce:  di  - The straight-line distance between major ports  of entry of reporter  and
partner from  Linneman (1966).
BORDER:  b', - Dummy =  1 if the countries i  and j share a common  border, 0 otherwise.
Regional Arrangements:  EC6, EA, NA - Dummy =  1 if both reporter and partner are
members of a regional block, 0 otherwise.
EC6P, EAP, NAP - Dummy =  1 if partner is a member of a
regional block, 0 otherwise.
27TABLE  I A:  GRAVITY MODEL OF BILATERAL TRADE
BEFORE  THE INTRODUCTION  OF REGIONAL  DUMMIES"
LHS  VARIABLE:  LOG OF TOTAL EXPORTS  *
REPORTER  CONST  LGDP I  LGDP  J  LPCGDPj  LDIST  BORDER ADJ R2 RT MSE
COUNTRY  (I)
Countrles In EA
HONG KONG  1.073  0.061  0.614  0.648  -0.884  1.766  0.69  1.165
0.45  0.43  13.33  15.10  -14.12  5.69
INDONESIA  -24.421  1.835  1.401  0.636  -3.504  -3.829  0.75  1.871
-2.14  2.91  20.34  7.62  -26.76  -14.00
JAPAN  8.164  0.114  0.695  0.279  -1.308  0  0.85  0.617
5.69  1.79  26.51  12.36  -31.81
KOREA  -13.726  0.740  0.396  0.577  -0.033  0  0.28  2.128
-3.60  4.16  4.19  5.13  -0.14
MALAYSIA  4.862  0.666  1.124  0.198  -2.095  -1.943  0.81  1.122
-1.23  2.88  27.88  5.24  -29.71  -5.63
TAIWAN (CHINA)  -10.562  0.821  0.323  0.819  -0.627  0  0.37  1.980
-3.23  4.98  3.29  7.53  -3.76
PHILIPPINES  15.881  -0.883  1.044  0.697  -1.865  0  0.73  1.538
1.83  -1.76  18.07  10.79  -18.80
SINGAPORE  -6.793  0.305  0.925  0.357  -0.809  1.959  0.35  2.493
-1.08  0.95  14.26  4.40  -2.09  1.21
THAILAND  -9.139  1.094  1.068  0.716  -2.942  -0.454  0.76  1.584
-2.95  6.22  22.92  13.63  -27.38  -2.27
Countries In NA
CANADA  -2.415  -0.250  0.965  0.004  0.228  2.526  0.82  0.745
-0.92  -2.03  34.28  0.16  2.20  11.88
MEXJCO  18.289  -0.263  1.232  -0.119  -2.865  -1.161  0.52  2.142
2.31  -0.66  19.24  -1.90  -14.44  -3.75
USA  -0.276  -0.069  0.750  0.133  0.171  2.003  0.75  0.736
-0.09  -0.52  31.48  4.07  1.59  11.53
28TABLE IA: CONTINUED
REPORTER  CONST  LGDP I  LGDP I  LPCGDPj  LDIST  BORDER ADJ R2 RT MSE
COUNTRY  (I)
Countries in EC6
BELGIUM-LUX  -2.925  0.327  0.785  0.063  -0.706  0.546  0.86  0.741
-1.53  3.13  25.94  1.69  -20.51  6.08
WEST  GERMANY  -2.687  0.359  0.724  0.149  -0.622  0.264  0.91  0.537
-1.55  4.27  35.78  5.78  -20.78  3.55
FRANCE  -2.068  0.316  0.722  0.092  -0.639  0.551  0.91  0.534
-1.33  4.06  35.53  3.62  -21.68  8.76
ITALY  -3.347  0.334  0.757  0.279  -0.789  -0.336  0.89  0.597
-2.43  5.22  34.98  10.98  -17.34  -3.10
NETHERLANDS  3.723  0.083  0.653  0.157  -0.742  0.714  0.87  0.687
1.92  0.80  26.67  5.62  -27.43  10.45
Countries outside regional groups
ARGENTINA  -5.912  0.487  0.868  -0.116  -0.844  1.739  0.46  1.423
-2.06  3.44  19.05  -2.14  -6.65  5.68
AUSTRALIA  15.673  0.024  1.270  0.214  -3.350  0  0.74  1.327
3.44  0.10  24.39  4.88  -24.55
BRAZIL  2.204  0.095  0.792  0.065  -0.809  1.152  0.69  0.815
0.84  0.73  27.57  1.90  -7.77  6.72
GREAT  BRITAIN  0.023  0.187  0.642  0.261  -0.516  1.443  0.76  0.859
0.01  1.45  22.88  6.84  -13.22  15.30
INDIA  -0.122  0.622  0.848  0.708  -2.648  -0.871  0.80  1.031
-0.02  2.27  23.33  14.70  -32.98  -2.67
* Variables  with  prefix 'L' are in log form. All  others are dummy variables.
Sample period is 1980-91.  No. of obvs. (N)  is 527, except PHL  439, DEU  and IND  484.
t-ratios  are given below the coefficients.
**  N=11419
POOLED  -12.379  0.831  0.837  0.174  -0.987  0.349  0.59  1.781
EQUATION  -27.64  72.22  55.60  9.58  -29.89  3.72
SOURCE:  UN  COMTRADE  Database
29TABLE 1  B:  GRAVITY  MODEL OF BILATERAL  TRADE
BEFORE  THE INTRODUCTION  OF REGIONAL  DUMMIES**
LHS  VARIABLE:  LOG OF TOTAL IMPORTS  *
REPORTER  CONST  LGDP I  LGDP  j  LPCGDP  LDIST  BORDER ADJ R2 RT MSE
COUNTRY  (I)
Countries In EA
HONG KONG  -5.486  0.472  0.935  0.598  -1.574  0.913  0.76  1.347
-1.96  2.81  17.24  10.70  -22.06  3.99
INDONESIA  -22.229  1.207  1.342  0.672  -2.255  -1.875  0.75  1.600
-2.22  2.21  24.69  14.45  -20.28  -7.51
JAPAN  2.743  0.250  0.858  0.145  -1.293  0  0.77  0.861
1.37  2.80  30.72  4.01  -19.84
KOREA  -16.656  0.594  0.627  0.762  -0.082  0  0.39  2.280
-4.13  3.12  6.71  7.06  -0.35
MALAYSIA  -8.686  0.697  0.954  0.476  -1.644  -0.478  0.59  1.547
-1.61  2.19  20.73  11.30  -15.56  -1.49
TAIWAN (CHINA)  -14.281  0.732  0.512  0.874  -0.513  0  0.42  2.090
-4.08  4.03  5.43  8.03  -3.10
PHIUPPINES  -9.121  0.450  1.116  0.855  -1.930  0  0.66  2.033
-0.82  0.69  19.91  10.43  -18.02
SINGAPORE  -10.290  0.310  1.005  0.600  -0.840  2.373  0.45  2.377
-1.73  1.03  16.68  8.25  -2.30  1.55
THAILAND  -6.534  0.550  1.203  0.631  -2.281  0.436  0.77  1.455
-2.06  3.24  21.37  13.57  -21.07  2.79
Countries In NA
CANADA  -13.782  0.333  0.877  0.298  0.107  1.977  0.78  0.910
-4.19  2.00  24.75  8.80  0.85  7.84
MEXICO  -26.801  1.385  0.821  0.383  -0.867  1.422  0.46  2.024
-3.57  3.68  17.62  7.61  -4.25  5.20
USA  -15.556  0.428  0.829  0.144  0.508  2.471  0.71  0.880
-4.18  2.52  28.25  3.73  3.53  11.06
30TABLE I1B:  CONTINUED
REPORTER  CONST  LGDP I  LGDP  J  LPCGDP  j  LDIST  BORDER ADJ R2 RT MSE
COUNTRY  (I)
Countries In EC6
BELGIUM-LUX  -4.399  0.383  0.663  0.188  -0.489  1.165  0.90  0.559
-0.20  5.01  31.16  8.67  -19.81  12.30
WEST GERMANY  -3.105  0.322  0.671  0.270  -0.489  0.228  0.86  0.658
-1.52  3.18  29.64  8.26  -13.50  2.88
FRANCE  -4.829  0.370  0.693  0.237  -0.494  0.522  0.91  0.521
-3.20  5.23  42.52  10.26  -19.23  6.63
ITALY  -2.148  0.255  0.754  0.213  -0.653  -0.166  0.88  0.601
-1.51  3.86  35.09  10.63  -18.04  -1.61
NETHERLANDS  -2.811  0.226  0.689  0.235  -0.395  1.219  0.83  0.735
-1.38  2.10  27.62  7.72  -12.53  13.68
Countrles outside regional groups
ARGENTINA  -5.183  -0.120  0.740  0.693  -0.278  4.173  0.53  1.788
-1.49  -0.68  13.47  10.26  -1.40  9.17
AUSTRALIA  10.809  -0.087  1.124  0.583  -2.575  0  0.70  1.401
2.38  -0.37  21.53  14.78  -19.73
BRAZIL  -4.425  0.378  1.005  0.312  -1.507  1.490  0.58  1.560
-1.01  1.72  17.92  4.07  -8.96  4.79
GREAT  BRITAIN  -3.621  0.265  0.670  0.398  -0.445  1.174  0.75  0.957
-1.26  1.77  21.25  12.36  -11.75  12.83
INDIA  -1.028  0.091  1.302  0.514  -2.087  -1.251  0.73  1.460
-0.13  0.23  20.69  7.63  -12.66  -4.73
* Variables  with  prefix 'L  are in log  form. All  others are dummy variables.
Sample  period is 1980-91.  No. of obvs. is 527, except IND  439,  PHL  and DEU  484.
The t-ratios  are given below the coefficients.
**  N = 11419
POOLED  -14.738  0.829  0.867  0.321  -0.910  0.326  0.64  1.803
EQUATION  -32.87  70.19  58.42  17.84  -28.18  3.40
SOURCE:  UN COMTRADE  Database
31TABLE  2A: GRAVITY  MODEL  OF BILATERAL  TRADE
DUMMIES: REPORTER  AND PARTNER  COUNTRIES  ARE BOTH IN THE REGION  **
WrrHOUT DUMMY  FOR  COMMON  BORDER
LHS  VARIABLE:  LOG  OF TOTAL  EXPORTS
REPORTER  CONST  LGDP  I  LGDP  j  LPCGDP  J  LOIST  EC6  EA  NA  ADJ R2  RT MSE
COUNTRY  0)
Countries In EA
HONG  KONG  4.293  0.W46  0.651  0.633  -1.271  0  -0.835  0  0.66  1.178
1.64  0.32  14.20  13.88  -10.25  -3.17
INDONESIA  -25.084  1.B19  1.455  0.596  -3.458  0  -0.701  0  0.73  1.932
-217  2.83  22.32  7.26  -16.77  -2.15
JAPAN  3.574  0.115  0.718  0.251  -0.830  0  0.927  0  0.86  0.587
2.42  1.93  28.55  12.58  -13.25  8.08
KOREA  -25.209  0.742  0.476  0.480  1.141  0  2.816  0  0.33  2.048
4.98  4.34  5.68  4.79  2.56  4.95
MALAYSIA  -7.554  0.665  1.160  0.161  -1.B22  0  -0.306  0  0.79  1.173
-1.80  0.74  27.87  4.18  -19.91  -1.70
TAIWAN  (CHINA)  -14.593  0.834  0.335  0.774  0.191  0  1.068  0  0.38  1.971
-3.67  5.07  3.48  7.57  -0.66  2.57
PHIUPPINES  16.393  -0.889  1.045  0.701  -1.915  0  -0.118  0  0.73  1.539
1.85  -1.77  18.09  10.82  -9.30  -0.31
SINGAPORE  -1.732  0.274  0.919  0.424  -1.363  0  -0.960  D  0.35  2490
-0.31  0.86  12.42  4.76  -6.71  -2.96
THAILAND  4.145  1.007  1.110  0.826  -4.410  0  -2.958  0  0.80  1.455
1.2B  5.89  25.74  16.63  -24.16  -11.83
Countries In NA
CANADA  0.11  B  -0.250  0.993  -0.035  -0.099  0  0  0.859  0.80  0.782
0.04  -1.90  36.12  -1.15  -0.93  3.48
MEXICO  17.857  -0.260  1.211  -0.104  -2-792  0  0  -0.490  0.52  2145
2.26  -0.65  19.77  -1.68  -14.96  -1.98
USA  -0.276  -0.069  0.750  0.133  0.171  0  0  2.004  0.75  0.736
-0.09  -0.52  31.48  4.07  1.59  11.53
32TABLE  2A: CONTINUED
REPORTER  CONST  LGDPI  LGDPJ  LPCGDPj  LDIST  EC6  EA  NA  ADJ  2  RT  MSE
COUNTRY  (I)
Countries  In EC6
BELGIUM-LUX  -3.034  0.337  0.768  0.06o1  -0.685  0.699  0  0  0.87  0.731
-1.61  3.25  24.75  1.85  -21.78  9.42
WESTGERMANY  -2.472  0.365  0.711  0.156  -0.639  0.314  0  0  0.91  0.535
-1.44  4.35  33.99  5.94  -24.24  4.60
FRANCE  -1.882  0.313  0.727  0.093  -0.662  0.463  0  0  0.91  0.541
-1.20  3.98  35.35  3.56  -21.95  6.48
ITALY  4.317  0.357  0.728  0.272  -0.691  0.663  0  0  0.90  0.577
-3.34  5.84  34.80  10.78  -21.16  10.88
NETHERLANDS  3.592  0.099  0.627  0.164  -0.713  0.734  0  0  0.88  0.678
1.871  0.950  24.286  5.916  -26.861  9.740
Countries outside regional groups
ARGENTINA  0.223  0.524  0.858  -0.184  -1.513  0  0  0  0.44  1.452
0.08  3.62  17.95  -3.55  -21.75
AUSTRALA  15.673  0.024  1.270  0.214  -3350  0  0  0  0.74  1.327
3.44  0.10  24.39  4.88  -24.55
BRAZIL  6.979  0.173  0.759  -0.005  -1.373  0  0  0  0.65  0.859
2.60  1.28  23.97  -0.17  -19.49
GREAT  BRITAIN  0.695  0.219  0.614  0.251  -0.600  0  0  0  0.75  0.B80
0.27  1.66  21.41  6.48  -14.79
INDIA  -0.389  0.584  0.802  0.802  -2.529  0  0  0  0.80  1.043
-0.07  210  24.43  18.84  -24.06
* Variables  with prefix 'L' are in log form.  All others are dummy  variables.
Sample  period is 1980-91.  No. of obvs. (N) is 527,  except PHL  439,  DEU  & IND  484
t-ratios are given below the coefficients.
N =11419
POOLED  -13.615  0.864  0.825  0.200  -0.918  0.153  0.740  0.143  0.59  1.774
EQUATION  -36.16  77.66  53.26  11.49  -37.26  2.02  10.55  1.73
SOURCE:  UN  COMTRADE  Database
33TABLE  25: GRAVITY  MODEL  OF BILATERAL  TRADE
DUMMIES: REPORTER  AND PARTNER  COUNTRIES  ARE BOTH  IN THE REGION  **
WITHOUT  DUMMY  FOR  COMMON  BORDER
LHS  VARIABLE:  LOG OF  TOTAL  IMPORTS'
REPORTER  CONST  LGDPI  LGDPj  LPCGDPI  LDIST  EC6  EA  NA  ADJ  R2  RT  MSE
COUNTRY (0
Countries  In EA
HONG  KONG  -6.456  0.478  0.967  0.552  -1.498  0  0,295  0  0.76  1.351
-2.13  2.82  19.56  10.14  -11.65  1.08
INDONESIA  -26.874  1.251  1.336  0.638  -1.786  0  0.675  0  0.75  1.611
-2.66  2.29  23.38  13.55  -10.14  2.79
JAPAN  4.581  0.253  0.894  0.099  -0.531  0  1.479  0  0.80  0.806
-2,11  3.01  32.42  2.29  -4.17  7.25
KOREA  -34.812  0.597  0.754  0.609  1.774  0  4.452  0  0.49  2.087
-7.23  3.38  9.33  6.59  4.35  8.28
MALAYSIA  -12993  0.744  0.911  0.474  -1.171  0  1.160  0  0.67  1.520
-2.45  2.40  18.75  12.22  -11.25  7.44
TAIWAN  (CHINA)  -24.915  0.766  0.542  0.756  0.638  0  2.818  0  0.46  2.018
-6.24  4.34  5.97  7.43  2.27  6.98
PHILIPPINES  -15.726  0.517  1.114  0.811  -1.286  0  1.541  0  0.66  2.014
-1.41  0.80  19.60  10.62  -5.80  3.48
SINGAPORE  -7.745  0.299  0.953  0.684  -1.081  0  0.122  0  0.45  2391
-1.47  0.98  13s58  802  -5.28  0.40
THAILAND  -1.237  0.519  1.210  0.680  -2.860  0  -1.065  0  0.78  1.438
-0.37  3.07  21.59  14.30  -13.82  -4.02
Countries In NA
CANADA  -13.448  0.328  0.874  0.311  0.075  0  0  1.497  0.78  0.901
-4.17  1.98  25.56  9.49  0.68  8.54
MEXICO  -26.601  1.3B7  0.834  0.367  -0.905  0  0  0.895  0.46  2.025
-3.55  3.8  18.50  7.44  4.59  4.20
USA  -15.556  0.428  0.830  0.145  0.509  0  0  2.472  0.71  0.80
4.18  2.52  28.25  3.73  3.55  11.06
34TABLE  2B:  CONTINUED
REPORTER  CONST  LGDP  I  LGDP  J  LPCGDP  J  LDIST  EC6  EA  NA  ADJ R2  RT  MSE
COUNTRY  (0
Countries In EC6
BELGIUM-LUX  -4.222  0.397  0.650  0.1804  -0.506  1.029  0  0  0.90  0.556
-3.08  5.20  29.58  8.32  -21.13  11.91
WEST  GERMANY  -3.213  0.330  0.647  0.287  -0.459  0.600  0  0  0.86  0.645
-1.61  3.30  27.07  8.65  -15.05  9.00
FRANCE  -5.067  0.372  0.685  0.249  -0.460  0.604  0  0  0.92  0.505
-3.45  5.39  42.03  10.82  -18.53  12.44
ITALY  -3.291  0.298  0.705  0.201  -0.513  1.172  0  0  0.91  0.522
-2.70  5.16  35.27  10.83  -25.84  21.30
NETHERLANDS  -2.362  0.241  0.677  0.220  -0.442  0.559  0  0  0.02  0.754
-1.130  2.174  25.143  7.323  -13.824  5.297
Countries outside regional groups
ARGENTINA  9.537  -0.031  0.714  0.530  -1.882  0  0  0  0.46  1.920
2.69  -0.17  10.96  8.14  -17.97
AUSTRALIA  10.809  -0.087  1.124  0.583  -2.575  0  0  0  0.70  1.401
2.38  -0.37  21.53  14.78  -19.73
BRAZIL  1.749  0.479  0.962  0.220  -2.238  0  0  0  0.56  1.598
0.40  2.12  16.77  3.02  -21.50
GREAT  BRITAIN  -3.075  0.291  0.648  0.390  -0.513  0  0  0  0.75  0.969
-1.05  1.92  20.46  11.99  -13.35
INDIA  -1.405  0.036  1.235  0.650  -1.916  0  0  0  0.73  1.476
-0.18  0.09  20.61  10.55  -11.90
'Variables with prefix 'L' are in log form. All others  are dummy  variables.
Sample  period  is 1980-91.  No. of  obvs.  (N)  is 527,  except IND  439, PHL  & DEU  484.
The t-ratios  are given below the coefficients.
N = 11419
POOLED  -17.193  0.865  0.843  0.365  -0.751  0.362  1.283  0.343  0.62  1.780
EQUATION  -44.71  77.39  55.30  21.26  -30.65  4.79  19.52  3.70
SOURCE:  UN  COMTRADE  Database
35TABLE  MA:  GRAVITY  MODEL  OF  BILATERAL  TRADE
DUMMIES:  ONLY  PARTNER  COUNTRY  IS  IN  THE  REGION*'
WITHOUT  DUMMY  FOR  COMMON  BORDER
LH8  VARIABLE:  LOG  OF  TOTAL  EXPORTS'
REPORTER  CONST  LODP  I  LGDP  J  LPCGDP  I  LDI9T  ECOP  EAP  NAP  ADJ  R2 RT  MBE
COUNTRY  (I)
Countrles  In  EA
HONG  KONG  4.910  0.109  0.561  0.627  -1.294  0.670  -0.727  0.679  0.69  1.161
1.90  0.77  10.43  14.12  -10.65  4.34  -2.93  2.84
INDONESIA  -26.994  2.066  1,296  0.569  3.440  1.333  -0.391  1.178  0.74  1.994
-2.38  3.27  17.41  7.10  -16.48  5.68  -1.22  5.51
JAPAN  3.531  0.139  0.677  0.245  0.803  0.192  1.010  0.3B7  0.86  0.582
2.40  2.37  24.35  12-44  -1239  1.86  8.49  3.26
KOREA  -24.272  0.802  0.345  0.484  1,151  0.423  3.033  1.568  0.35  2.023
-4.88  4.73  3.55  4.77  2.58  2.77  5.20  5.11
MALAYSIA  -8.319  0.742  1.119  0.134  -1.790  0.767  -0.164  -0.130  0.80  1.152
-2.02  3.10  22.20  3.62  -19.59  4.03  -0.88  -0.72
TAIWAN  (CHINA)  -12.792  0.937  0.130  0.767  -0.215  1.132  1.356  1.987  0.41  1.915
-3.38  5.77  1.22  7.56  -076  7.84  3.19  6.47
PHILUPPINES  14.150  -0.602  0.907  0.671  -1.942  1.306  0.090  0.858  0.75  1.498
1.65  -1.23  12.72  10.66  -9.44  5.93  0.25  3.29
SINGAPORE  -1.903  0.266  0.936  0.419  -1.357  -0.003  -0.977  -0.241  0.35  2.494
-0.35  0.62  10.97  4.66  -6.67  -0.02  -2.67  -1.32
THAILAND  3.800  1.109  1.007  0.752  4.350  1.316  -2.667  0.330  0.81  1.412
1.22  6.74  19.09  16.63  -24.51  5.81  -10.94  1.27
Countries  In  NA
CANADA  4.645  -0.159  0.899  -0.044  -0.653  D.187  0.985  0.722  0.84  0.702
1.96  -1.37  33.43  -1.54  -5.52  1.64  12.67  3.58
MEXICO  16.455  -0.231  1.195  -0.138  -2628  0.439  -0.360  -0.295  0.52  2.139
2i10  -0.58  16.50  -1.85  -15.63  2.66  -0.98  -1.05
USA  5,533  0.055  0.638  0.109  -0.604  0.471  1.315  1.368  0.84  0.586
2.27  0.53  27.86  4.07  -.10  5.33  17.51  9.28
36TABLE 3A: CONTINUED
REPORTER  CONST  LGDP  I  LGDP  j  LPCGDP  j  LDIST  EC6P  EAP  NAP  AWI R2  RT MSE
COUNTRY (I)
Countrles In EC6
BELGIUM-LLrX  -1.926  0.346  0.762  0.060  -0.839  0.494  0.801  -0.381  0.89  0.656
-1.15  3.75  20.95  1.75  -29.13  6.38  8.65  -3.40
WEST  GERMANY  -1.706  0.364  0.715  0.151  0.749  0.176  0.599  -0.374  0.93  0.470
-1.15  5.02  32.98  6.99  -26.31  2.43  9.72  -4.09
FRANCE  -0.825  0.339  0.699  0.084  -0.807  0.319  0.660  -0.008  0.92  0.487
-0.60  4.91  31.41  3.85  -27.95  4.80  9.47  -D.11
ITALY  -4.012  0.347  0.737  0.283  -0.716  0.625  0.305  -0.328  0.91  0.557
-3.24  5.85  29.50  12.17  -20.38  9.32  4.06  -3.77
NETHERLANDS  4.579  0.102  0.627  0.158  -0.855  0.525  0.739  -0.442  0.90  0.603
2.71  1.11  22.73  5.87  -26.76  6.41  9.94  -4.08
Countries outside reglonal groups
ARGENTINA  1.934  0.622  0.700  -0.190  -1.62B  1.657  0.796  0.856  0.50  1.368
0.79  4.57  11.94  -3.73  -17.90  8.59  4.75  4.25
AUSTRALUA  10.440  0.135  1.201  0.179  -2.860  1.055  0.917  -0.514  0.77  1.251
2.44  0.60  18.73  4.32  -25.07  6.65  7.58  -2.56
BRAZIL  10.311  0.219  0.688  0.016  -1.772  0.826  1.071  0.441  0.72  0.765
4.34  1.86  1B.97  0.55  -17.94  8.06  10.23  4.19
GREAT  BRITAIN  1.620  0.272  0.557  0.242  -0.738  0.199  0.790  0.164  0.78  0.836
066  2.14  14.62  5.60  -11.53  1.99  6.44  0.99
iNDIA  -2.740  0.783  0.615  0.838  -2.3B7  1.116  0.883  1.074  0.83  0.961
-0.54  3.04  14.62  20.81  -21.05  7.30  6.83  5.65
*  Variables  with prefix 'L'are  in log fotm. Af others  are dummy  variables.
Sample  period is 1980-91.  No. of obvs. (N) is 627,  except  PHL  439,  IEU & IND  484.
t-ratios  an  given below the coefficients.
N = 11419
POOLED  -11.286  0.833  0.733  0.220  -0.973  0.722  0.859  0.466  0.60  1.747
EQUATION  -27.77  73.55  42.44  12.40  -39.65  17.13  20.62  8.24
SOURCE:  UN  COMTRADE  Database
37TABLE 3B: GRAVITY  MODEL  OF BILATERAL  TRADE
DUMMIES: ONLY  PARTNER  COUNTRY  IS  IN THE REGION**
WITHOUT  DUMMY  FOR  COMMON  BORDER
LHS  VARIABLE:  LOG OF  TOTAL  IMPORTS*
REPORTER  CONST  LGDPI  LGDPJ  LPCGDPJ  LDIST  EC6P  EAP  NAP  ADJ R2  RT  MSE
COUNTRY (
Countries In EA
HONG  KONG  -6.322  0.494  0,964  0.532  -1.527  0.605  0.254  -0.533  0.77  1.331
-2.12  2.88  15.08  9.84  -11.92  4.13  0.91  -3.06
INDONESIA  -27.421  1.272  1.338  0.623  -1.762  0.280  0.715  -0.301  0.75  1.609
-2.70  2.31  20.52  13.17  -9.94  1.58  2.95  -1.B0
JAPAN  -5.658  0.25B  0.879  0.100  -0.397  -0.299  1.681  0.589  0.81  0.788
-2.61  3.09  28.74  2.93  -2.99  -3.73  7.80  5.35
KOREA  -34.804  0.618  0.692  0.620  1.833  -0.199  4.641  1.178  0.50  2.070
-7.31  3.51  7.19  6.58  4.48  -1.35  8.35  4.79
MALAYSIA  -13.532  0.810  0.871  0.456  -1.150  0.568  1.276  0.051  0.67  1.515
-2.54  2.56  15.00  11.45  -11.06  3.58  7.43  0.21
TAIWAN  (CHINA)  -23.859  0.826  0.417  0.755  0.629  0.579  3.004  1.328  0.47  1.999
-6.11  4.66  3.9B  7.34  2.25  4.25  7.09  5.55
PHIUPPINES  -16.714  0.649  1.04B  0.796  -1.300  0.639  1.639  0.393  0.67  2.009
-1.49  0.99  14.71  10.27  -5.77  2.96  3.74  1.52
SINGAPORE  -8220  0.276  1.001  0.671  -1.064  -0.009  0.072  -0.671  0.45  2.390
-1.56  0.90  12.37  7.87  -5.16  -0.07  0.23  -3.67
THAILAND  -1.367  0.513  1.220  0.677  -2852  0.003  -1.069  -0.156  0.78  1.440
-0.40  3.01  18.59  14.08  -13.76  0.02  -3.93  -0.90
Countries In NA
CANADA  -6.982  0.418  0.775  0.303  -0.700  -0.0B4  1.283  1.159  0.84  0.773
-2.46  2.87  23.18  11.37  -7.26  -1.06  15A6  7.56
ME)ICO  -29.247  1.429  0.820  0.309  -0.603  0.628  -0.686  1.174  0.47  1.999
-4.04  3.85  14.47  4.84  -3.49  4.64  -1.97  4.69
USA  -6.354  0.558  0.711  0.117  -0.667  0.185  1.854  1.339  0.86  0.621
-2.33  4.54  25.00  4.07  -6.10  2.51  23.61  7.71
38TABLE  38:  CONTINUED
REPORTER  CONST  LGDP  I  LGDPJ  LPCGOP  J  LDIST  EC6P  EAP  NAP  ADJ R2  RT  MSE
COUNTRY (Q
Countries In EC6
BELGIUM-LUX  4.094  0.373  0.678  0.185  -0.537  0.902  0.228  -0.514  0.91  0.533
-4.09  5.08  29.11  8.71  -20.71  10.65  3.53  -4,58
WEST  GERMANY  -2.174  0.314  0.671  0,284  0.615  0.364  0.881  -0.790  0.92  0.497
-1.41  4.07  33.24  11.58  -22.12  5.31  13.73  -a40
FRANCE  3.992  0.391  0.665  0.243  -0.609  0.638  0.698  -0.139  0.94  0.432
-3.20  6.57  42.45  13.76  -22.13  10.19  12.69  -1.57
ITALY  -3,660  0.259  0.757  0.214  -0.495  1.054  0.072  -0.751  0.92  0.491
-3.26  4.71  34.54  11.85  -19.64  17.73  1.22  -7.06
NETHERLANDS  -0,515  0.298  0.625  0.198  -0.700  0.324  1.228  -0.027  0.89  0.610
-0.30  3.21  22.32  9.61  -23.71  3.90  17.86  -0.20
Countries outside regional groups
ARGENTINA  10.001  n.067  0.565  0.505  -1.836  1.215  0.179  1.040  0.47  1.891
2.60  -0.35  7.21  7.90  -17.18  6.80  0.69  4.16
AUSTRALIA  3.689  -0.019  1.079  0.562  -1.841  0.393  1.124  -0.479  0.73  1.347
0.83  -0.08  16.71  13.i9  -12.76  2.56  8.25  -2.41
BRAZIL  7.547  0.510  0.870  0.281  -2898  0.529  1.672  1.151  0.61  1.493
1.7B  2.34  15.71  4.24  -18.23  4.40  7.74  6.76
GREAT  BRITAIN  -1.594  0.327  0.616  0.376  -0.730  0.005  1.098  -0.221  0.79  0.879
-0.63  2.27  16.16  10.36  -12.13  0.05  9.20  -1.38
INDIA  -3.534  0.089  1.169  0.679  -1.704  0.402  0.839  -0.022  0.74  1.447
-0.46  0.22  15.44  10.62  -10.79  1.66  5.60  -0.10
* Variables  with  prefix  'L' are  in log  form.  All  others  are  dummy  varables.
Sample  period  is 1980-91.  No.  of obvs.  rN) is 527,  except  IND  439,  PHL  &  DEU  484.
t-ratios  are  given  below  the  coefficients.
N = 11419
POOLED  -14.267  0.829  0.788  0.390  -0.890  0.387  0.999  0.267  0.62  1.763
EQUATION  -35.35  72.56  46.43  22.40  -36.64  10.07  22.62  5.56
SOURCE:  UN  COMTRADE  Database
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